The Institutional Architecture of the Eurozone

Labour market policy
The most erroneous liberal-market premise of the EMU is the assumption that labour market actors, particularly trade unions, either do not exist or are too weak to resist competitive downward pressure on wages. The design of Europe's shared currency is premised on the non-existence of organised labour (Crouch, 2000) and shares the neoclassical assumption that labour markets can and do operate in perfectly competitive markets. This implicit design of the monetary union assumes that if asymmetric shocks hit, national economies, regions and sectoral industries will automatically adapt through a reduction in labour costs. This reduction in labour costs is presumed to act as a functional equivalent to currency devaluations at a macro-level (see Hall and Gingerich, 2004) .
Currency devaluation traditionally externalised excessive endogenous labour costs to the main trading partners of a given national economy (Crouch, 2000) . Devaluation and exchange rate adjustments acted as a cushion to avoid social dislocation when national economies became over inflated. This option is no longer available for countries of the Eurozone. The implication is that an 'internal devaluation' must be pursued by member-states when confronted with an economic shock. This does not take into consideration the structural and current account imbalances within the Eurozone nor the distributional implications of shifting the burden of adjustment on to wages and public spending.
The assumption that the entire burden of cost adjustment can fall on labour market actors completely ignores the embedded and historically diverse institutional structures of collective bargaining in European economies. Collective bargaining and negotiated wage setting is one of the core features of coordinated market capitalism or 'social Europe'. Figure 1 illustrates the different levels of bargaining coverage across the eurozone. Every economy with the exception of Ireland and Slovakia has collective bargaining coverage of over 60 percent. Slovenia, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain all have collective bargaining coverage at 80 percent or more (see Visser, 2009 ). This involvement of organised labour in wage setting makes it difficult to impose downward labour cost reductions across the economy. Neither will adjustment be so extensive that it can act as the functional equivalent to currency devaluation. Any adjustment in labour costs will be negotiated between labour market actors (at sectoral or national level) unless labour is so weak that it cannot resist a unilateral imposition of wage cuts. However, the rigid constraints of the EMU's budget deficit requirement, and the newly proposed fiscal treaty, means that government as employer may have no option but to impose a reduction in pay rates in the public sector.
Given the institutionally and historically evolved structure of coordinated wage setting in Europe, one should not assume that organised labour markets are strategically incapable of reducing labour costs through collective bargaining. Most research indicates that those sectors most exposed to international competition have been capable of concession bargaining and internalising significant levels of wage restraint (Hancké & Johnston, 2009 , Traxler & Brandl, 2010 , Crouch 2000 or adopting alternative labour market policies such as short term working to reduce costs. The question, for the state, however, is under what conditions can those sectors not exposed to international trade, particular those within the public sector, do the same. This is a significant problem for countries, under the conditions of a severe public finance crisis, where public-sector pay bargaining is systematically associated with national social partnership arrangements, as is the case in Ireland.
The Calmfors and Drifill (1988) model presented two scenarios for non-inflationary wage growth.
On one side of the u-trough are self-clearing liberal markets. There is no empirical evidence to support this scenario (outside the US and UK) even if it is deduced to be the most efficient mechanism of coordinating wages (see Soskice, 1990) . On the other side of the u-trough are peak level wage bargaining actors who coordinate wages at a national level. This national level coordination is required to incentivise trade unions to internalise the costs of inflationary wage agreements. Most corporatist economies, however, have evolved away from national level coordination. This led many economists to conclude that the advent of the EMU would provide an incentive for the complete de-regulation of wage setting akin to self-clearing markets. This did not occur. As illustrated by Crouch (2000) wage setting institutions evolved and adapted to new economic constraints. Most labour market actors adopted an 'organised decentralisation' (Austria, Germany and Sweden) of collective bargaining whilst some integrated centralised wage negotiations into national tax-based income agreements (Ireland and Finland).
Hence, whilst the new monetarist paradigm acted as a stimulus for institutions of coordinated wage setting to evolve they did not disappear. Wages and labour markets are still institutionally regulated by collective organisations.
The design of the EMU simply assumes that embedded institutions of collective bargaining do not exist or if they do, the state and employers can effectively ignore them. In the Irish case, centralised wage agreements continued under the auspices of the EMU, but the actors never internalised the constraint that if confronted with a macro-economic shock, and lacking the capacity to engage in currency devaluation, the entire burden of adjustment would have to fall on wage, labour and fiscal policy.
Nor did they provide for collective buffers to offset the negative effects of an economic shock, as provided for in the Finish income agreements.
Fiscal policy
The EMU was designed for a symmetric pan-European economy but operates in an asymmetric way (see Hancké et al 2009) . The narrow focus on wage cost competitiveness and fiscal consolidation ignores the institutional diversity, complex problems and structural imbalances both across and within eurozone economies. Policymakers in the ECB assumed that all eurozone economies would converge in both price and wage costs. Most of the evidence indicates, however, that post-EMU, national and regional economies increasingly diverged on these indicators (see Lane, 2009 ). Countries shared a monetary currency but not the corresponding institutional governance required to coordinate economic policy. Market processes alone, and a narrow focus on liberalisation, have proved to be an ineffective means of European integration (see Scharpf, 2011 ). From 1999 -2008 , large export countries at the centre of the eurozone (Germany) continued to run current account surpluses. This surplus capital and savings was channelled into peripheral economies of the Eurozone (Ireland and Spain, in particular) creating an unnecessary oversupply of credit (facilitated by low ECB interest rates) that was channelled into a poorly regulated domestic financial market which in turn channelled the cheap credit into real estate, as will be shown in later sections. This structural divergence cannot be accommodated by monetary policy alone. In the absence of a central government or a functional equivalent each national economy operates as though they are institutionally independent.
The crisis in the sovereign bond markets that emerged in 2008, however, provided an exogenous stimulus for eurozone economies to recognise the extent of their financial interdependence and the instability of integrated European finance-capital markets. Yet the policy prescriptions adopted were oriented toward nationalistic austerity packages not coordinated strategies of collective action to tackle structural trade imbalances that had accumulated since 2000 (see Felipe & Kumar, 2011) .
The implicit assumption of the EMU is that economic problems only emerge from budgetary indiscipline not risky and unsustainable economic behaviour in the private market (see Pissani-Ferry, 2010) . The growth and stability pact was designed on the basis that public spending is the primary problem facing national governments. The crisis in Ireland, however, was the direct result of a collapse in private property investment and the associated tax revenues government had come to depend upon. Both Ireland and Spain experienced an asset price (housing) boom upon entry to the EMU. Non-fiscal asset price bubbles facilitated by cheap credit and low ECB interest rates created this problem not government spending (see next section). Or, more precisely, the problem is not labour costs and government spending but the mismanagement of private capital by private actors coupled with an unsustainable tax base. The ECB, however, operates according to average (mean) indicators of labour costs and inflation across seventeen eurozone economies. Hence, whilst the Irish economy was overheating internally, the ECB continued to cut interest rates to encourage higher levels of economic growth in what was perceived to be the underperforming economies of Germany and France.
Furthermore, during the period 1999-2009 it was Greece, Germany, Italy and France that regularly exceeded the 3 percent deficit requirement of the growth and stability pact. Ireland, as will be shown in later sections, went from a stable budget balance to a fiscal deficit of 14.7 percent in less than two years. Spain went from a stable budget surplus to a deficit of 10.1 percent in less than 18 months.
Spain actually ran a fiscal surplus in 2005 , 2006 (EU Commission, 2010 . This begs the question as to whether it is genuinely feasible to use the statistical mean of the growth and stability pact, and the new fiscal treaty, as a basis for how national economies should manage their budget deficits in an economic crisis. With the exception of Greece, all European political economies, by this 'fiscal' indicator, behaved relatively prudently in the post-EMU era.
These fiscal indicators, however, mask the type and level of government tax and spend policies specific to particular national economies. Ireland did not run a significant deficit but successive governments institutionalised an unsustainable low tax regime based around 'political budget cycles' (see M Cousins, 2007) . Government revenue became reliant upon consumption and pro-cyclical taxes (i.e. stamp duty on property) that evaporated when its liquidity rich and credit fuelled housing bubble burst.
Furthermore, social partnership legitimised this process. The EMU is not designed to tackle unsustainable growth strategies of national economies or the structural composition of tax revenues. It simply assumes that government spending in-itself is the problem. Therefore, the EU commission and international rating agencies never questioned Ireland's economic growth model or its fiscal policy regime.
Hence, the narrow focus on fiscal and cost competitiveness (central to European monetary policy) meant that when the crisis emerged in 2008 it was assumed the problems facing 'peripheral' economies of the Eurozone (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy), were the same. This was not the case. The Greek problem was definitively fiscal, related to government spending and specific to its own national economy. On the other hand, Ireland and Spain regularly ran budget surpluses and institutionalised a low tax regime that was supported by international bodies such as the IMF and the OECD. Both countries rank below the EU 27 average on two policy indicators that normally impact upon budget deficits: total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP and total spending on social protection as a percentage of GDP. Total taxation as a percentage of GDP is also significantly below the EU-27. Yet given the neoclassical design of the EMU both countries must cut expenditure to tackle their deficits despite having relatively low levels of public spending as a percentage of national income.
In a stochastic world, monetary constraints are the primary collective action problem facing countries of the eurozone not fiscal deficits or wage competitiveness (Darvas, Pissani-Ferry, 2011) . But the politics of fiscal adjustment is mediated through country-specific institutions of collective bargaining, industrial relations and social policy regimes (i.e. the institutionalised power resources that are available to the social partners), which I will now turn my attention toward.
The Institutional Architecture of Irish Industrial Relations
The legal and institutional framework of collective bargaining is the most important variable in accounting for the diversity of responses to the economic crisis across Europe (Glassner & Keune, 2010) .
It is also the most important variable in accounting for national industrial relations regimes. Social partnership, as it evolved in Ireland, is a particular mode of governance that can be distinguished from sectoral and firm negotiation in wage bargaining. It is a government led tripartite strategy to involve organised interests in the formulation of public policy but systematically tied to the negotiation of income agreements in sheltered sectors of the economy (Traxler & Brandl 2010) . In the absence of this wage setting function, social partnership provides an 'expressive' function that acts as a symbolic legitimation of government policy (see Traxler, 2010) . The social partnership arrangements of Central and Eastern Europe arguably fall into this latter category.
If social partnership is a political strategy to coordinate income policy in sheltered sectors of the economy (in particular, the public sector) then it is this form of centralised wage coordination that will come under greatest pressure for downward wage flexibility, in the current crisis. Governments faced with the requirement to cut budget deficits have very little to trade with trade unions when public sector pay is a significant portion of general government expenditure. If centralised wage agreements only cover the unionised sectors of the economy (as is the case in Ireland but not Slovenia, Netherlands or Finland) then wage-setting excludes the majority of the workforce. It is this structure of 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' bargaining that conditions whether the social partners adopt a market or collective bargaining response to the crisis. Government operating within a labour market with 'exclusive' bargaining are more likely to pursue a unilateral strategy of adjustment. They can opt out of a social partnership agreement with little repercussion because trade unions do not have the power resources to be considered a necessary political partner. Governments only have to engage with public sector unions as an employer.
Coordinated wage bargaining that is inclusive across the economy confers significant bargaining power upon the social partners to negotiate labour cost reductions. This multi-employer type of bargaining (as witnessed in Germany, Austria and Netherlands) confers bargaining coverage of over 70 percent and empowers trade union and employer associations to coordinate their interests autonomously.
Given this institutional structure, labour market actors are likely to use internal (firm/sectoral) and external (national) collective bargaining strategies when negotiating a cost adjustment, despite the constraints of the EMU. In this regard, it is those economies that have exclusive bargaining coverage (only Ireland, Estonia and Slovakia have collective bargaining coverage below 45 percent in the Eurozone) that are more likely to experience a fragmented collective bargaining regime 1 . The micro-conditions in these labour markets do not act as a counter-force to asymmetric macro-economic shocks, and limit the capacity to adopt a coordinated response. This is particularly the case when negotiated wage agreements are not just exclusive to particular sectors of the economy but contain no legal requirement on multinationals or small firms to implement negotiated wage settlements. This voluntarist dimension complements a market based adjustment. Employer associations do not encompass the majority of firms covered by national wage agreements, making tripartite structures of social dialogue dependent upon the political preference of government. This explains the central role of the state in Ireland.
Hence, voluntarist institutions of social partnership that are only applicable to unionised sectors of the economy (Ireland), as opposed to inclusive and legally binding institutions of wage setting (Finland, Netherlands and Slovenia), weaken the power resources of labour, and decrease the possibility of a negotiated response to the economic crisis. Higher levels of trade union and employer density increase the capacity for negotiated labour market cost reductions when combined with high levels of collective bargaining coverage. From the perspective of government and employers, weak institutional foundations in the labour market make it easier for them to avoid social partnership, even if this is less effective than a negotiated adjustment based on deliberative agreement. Employer associations are organised on the basis of business lobby groups and their labour market strategies are primarily mediated by employment rights legislation (i.e. individual based adjudication rather than collective bargaining).
In this regard, liberal market political economies (where market processes act as the main incentive for economic coordination and legislation prioritised over collective bargaining in resolving employment disputes) are better placed to internalise the macro-economic shocks in the Eurozone. In terms of the EMU, it is only Ireland that falls into this category. The industrial relations regime in this country make it easier to implement orthodox economic policies as the institutional complementarities governing labour market, fiscal and wage policy fit the liberal design of the EMU. Conflict is primarily mediated through dialogue and adjudication via the Labour Relations Commission (detailed in section 6).
This dimension of social partnership has remained intact during the crisis whereas the national consensus based approach to socio-economic policy and pay bargaining has collapsed, leading to an absence of coordination and increased de-regulation of the labour market 2 .
The Origins of the Irish Economic Crisis -the Euro?
The origin of the Irish economic crisis can be found in the reckless behaviour of private market actors in global finance markets. Post-2000 the aggressive deregulation of global finance markets and domestic 1 In Ireland this leads to increased dualisation between the unionised (public and semi-state) and the non-unionised workforce. 2 Making it difficult to develop a coordinated strategy that reduces job losses credit-mortgage markets led to unprecedented levels of interbank lending within member states of the Eurozone (Lane, 2011) austerity package, and a series of structural reforms, to be implemented over four years.
The transmission effect of finance into the real economy has produced what Colin Crouch (2009) calls 'privatized Keynesianism'. Demand managed Keynesianism associated with the Fordist era of production enabled the expansion of mass production with mass consumers through real wage growth.
As prosperity stagnated, with the demise of 'les trente glorieuses', capitalist democracies had to find new ways to combine the need for accumulation, mass consumer demand and social stability. Policymakers across the western world responded by opening up product, finance and labour markets to increased trade and competition. This increased flexibility in the labour market created the conundrum of how to sustain domestic demand and high levels of consumption. Countries with a strong manufacturing base such as Germany exported the problem by securing confident consumers in countries such as Ireland, UK and the USA. These countries increasingly relied upon personally delivered domestic services to generate employment. The problem of how to sustain a consumption economy in an insecure flexible labour market was resolved by increasing the availability of cheap credit.
The growth of credit markets in Ireland, the UK and USA meant that these economies became premised on debt financed consumer spending. Hence, unlike the post-war European welfare state, individuals rather than the state took on debt to stimulate the economy. This debt in Ireland was mostly accounted for by household mortgages. Hence the shift from 'state' to 'privatised' Keynesianism.
Government policies began to encourage house-price inflation as a means to enable households to leverage credit for consumer spending. The rapid increase in the price of land and housing were considered 'good inflation' (Hay, 2009) . Rather than focus on increasing competitiveness through productive investment or the buying and selling of goods and services, the liberal oriented Anglo-IrishAmerican economies began to sell houses to one another as means to increase wealth.
Ireland is generally recognised as the only 'liberal market economy' (LME) in the Eurozone (Hall and Soskice, 2002) . It was the fastest growing economy to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU) and has a business model that is closer to the USA than Germany. In the pre-EMU period Ireland constructed an export economy premised on internationally traded goods and services in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and pharmaceutical sectors. When the economy began to slow down after the dotcom bubble a new growth model premised on credit driven finance emerged. Irish banks took advantage of the absence of exchange rate controls and low European Central Bank (ECB) interest rates, by borrowing excessively on the interbank money markets. Successive centre-right government's de-regulated finance and mortgage markets, and introduced a whole series of tax breaks for property construction. The outcome, as stated, was a colossal house price bubble.
The ECB maintained historically low interest rates in the Eurozone as a response to stagnant domestic demand in the German political economy. The sluggish German economy was a result of a decade of wage restraint (ILO, 2010) . Wage growth in the highly productive export sectors, particularly those in chemicals, engineering, steel and metal fabrication have been lower than almost every other OECD country. In some sectors, they have declined. But industrial output from these sectors has been growing steadily from the mid-1990s. Hence, their rate of profit has increased whilst wages have declined.
Most of this profit has been recycled into the finance industry. The growth in derivatives and other complex financial products has created what Wolfgang Streeck (2011) calls 'money factories'. These money factories recycle and repackage financial products and make their profit not from increasing productivity or investing in the real economy but through fluctuating interest rates.
The ECB-Frankfurt interest rates were aimed at mean or average inflation levels in the Eurozone.
But, in practice, interest rates were kept low because of stagnant domestic demand in the German economy, which was the direct outcome of holding down real wage growth. The impact in Ireland was negative interest rates and an influx of cheap money into the economy (see figure 7) . Domestic policymakers could not use monetary tools to contain inflationary pressures associated with rapidly rising house prices (which fuelled residential construction). In the context of an average 6 percent economic The Eurozone was an exogenous factor that facilitated an unsustainable boom in Ireland's property market, and a central factor that must be considered when examining the origins and impact of the crisis on social partnership.
The Origins of the Irish Economic Crisis -Domestic Policies?
In an ideal world Ireland would have mirrored the German political economy after its entry into the EMU. But given extensive historic-empirical research on the diversity of institutional configurations that make up national labour, fiscal and wage policy in Europe, this was unlikely to happen. The seventeen economies that make up the Eurozone have distinct welfare, wage and industrial relations regimes. Irish policymakers entered the Euro with a political economy that was gradually converging on European standards of living. But its expenditure on social protection and education as a percentage of GNP was significantly below the EU15 average. In addition, Ireland's physical infrastructure, a core factor in long term economic competitiveness, significantly lagged behind European standards. The largesse that was made available from the pre-EMU Celtic Tiger and European Structural Adjustment funds facilitated a massive capital expenditure programme from 2000 (see figure 8.2). Capital expenditure in 2004 was double the EU15 average. The National Development Plan was the strategic mechanism through which productive investment in roads, buildings, electricity and waste sewerage took place. This investment contributed to the inflationary pressures in the Irish economy but it also generated significant employment in construction.
The unproductive investment in Ireland's political economy occurred in the private real estate market. According to White (2010) The expansion of credit fuelled house prices shifted the Irish economic growth model from one premised on exports (pre-EMU) to one premised on construction (post-EMU). As detailed by Norris and Coates (2010) , the commercial mortgage sector was de-regulated as part of a wider process of domestic financial liberalisation. Policymakers were aware that house price inflation would lead to increased wage demands. But to tackle house price inflation the government adopted policies to increase the supply of housing (i.e. build more) rather than 'interfere' in the property market by managing lending criteria or controlling prices. The National Institute for Regional and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA) have described the The strategy adopted by the Irish government was to internalise the policy constraints of EMU and target public spending and unit labour costs as a means of adjustment. In terms of wage policy, government introduced emergency legislation to override the Payment of Wages Act for the public sector in the 2009 budget. This enabled government to implement a pay cut that averaged between 5 and 15 percent. It also sent a signal to the entire economy that the Payment of Wages Act was not an obstacle to downward wage flexibility in labour costs. This began a competitive devaluation of wages (although the evidence for pay cuts in the private sector is negligible). In labour market policy government have introduced some measures to offset unemployment but there was no statutory support for wage subsidies or short time working.
In fiscal policy most of the adjustment occurred via spending cuts rather than increased revenue (two thirds of the adjustment has occurred on the spending side). In 2009 €4.6bn was been taken out of expenditure but net government spending increased due to the surge in unemployment and expenditure on automatic stabilisers. Between 2010 and 2011, an additional €10bn adjustment was pursued, primarily through cuts in public sector pay, social welfare, capital investment and flat rate tax increases. Despite fiscal 'consolidation', the premium on government bonds increased. In 2008 the yield was 4.3 percent. In May 2010 the yield had increased to 5.9 percent. In November 2010, the government announced another €15bn austerity package to be introduced over four years. Bond yields subsequently rose to over 7 percent 4 . Fiscal austerity did not appease international investors and Ireland had to resort to an EU-IMF rescue package in December 2010, losing economic sovereignty (see Wolff, 2011) . But the conditions of this 'bailout' are no different to the four year programme for 'national recovery', adopted by government prior to the Troika agreement. The latter has become a political tool to ensure its implementation.
The Irish government adopted and internalised the constraints of the EMU in how it has responded to asymmetric shocks. It has pursued an internal devaluation that shifts the entire burden of adjustment on to the labour market without a corresponding investment strategy to boost the growth side of the debt-GNP equation. There has been no recovery in employment or a tri-partite agreement aimed at creating or maintaining jobs. The social partners attempted a negotiated solution to the crisis in 2009 but failed. We will now explain why, and the subsequent political and policy consequences in 2010-2012.
The Collapse of Social Partnership -National Wage and Fiscal Policies
One month prior to the economic collapse in November 2008 the social partners negotiated a National Wage Agreement titled 'towards 2016: Review and Transitional Agreement 2008/2009'. This agreed a pay pause for 11 months in the public sector and 3 months in the private sector, followed by a 6 percent increase over 18 months. It also included a commitment by government to improve collective bargaining rights, legislate for employment rights, continue with public sector reform and conclude an EU directive on temporary agency workers. The T16 social plan negotiated in 2006 was for ten years but the pay aspect of the agreement was to be-renegotiated every 24-36 months. The new transitional pay agreement was barely signed before the full extent of the crisis facing Irelands economy emerged. Immediately the government signalled its intention to seek a coordinated response and discussions began in the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). This was the beginning of a 12 month process aimed at negotiating a social partnership agreement that ultimately failed.
Negotiations on a national pact took place throughout December 2009. Significantly, the trade union movement agreed to a reduction of €4bn in current expenditure. This agreement fundamentally shifted the balance of power away from a public investment strategy. The ICTU now had to find a strategy of taking €4bn out of current expenditure without a reduction in the rates of public sector pay.
The Public Service Committee of ICTU in return provided a complex package of public sector reform and productivity increases, particularly in the education and health sectors. Government appeared to have accepted a reduction of €4bn via short term working schemes and a 'transformation agenda' aimed at productivity increases. The leader of IMPACT, one of the largest public sector unions, Peter McLoone, exited the talks on December 3 rd 2009 and publicly announced to the media that a social pact had been completed on 'unpaid leave'.
The government subsequently issued a statement saying the ICTU proposals did not provide an acceptable alternative to pay cuts and legislated for a second public sector pay cut. This amounted to approx. €1.3bn. Emergency legislation was introduced to override the Non-Payment of Wages Act (which makes it illegal to unilaterally cut pay without agreement). The main cuts in public sector pay are as follows: 5% on the first €30,000 salary, 7.5% on the next €40,000 salary, 10% on the next €55,000 salary. labour costs in the public sector. The report found that public sector workers earn, on average, more than 22 percent than their counterparts in the private sector. This is after taking into account age, experience and education. The report was central to a coordinating policy discourse that resulted in an increased politicisation of labour relations in the Irish public sphere. Whilst many economists supported its conclusions it was not without its critics. Industrial relations scholars argued that it is too simplistic to statistically compare a homogenous public sector to a homogenous private sector when there is such significant sectoral and occupational differentiation both within and across these sectors (see Geary, 2010 ).
This challenged not the politics of wage coordination in the sheltered sectors of the economy but the methodological complexity of measuring unit labour costs in a heterogeneous economy. (Sweeny, 2009 ) that if government are cutting wages they need to make explicit whether it is for cost saving, competitiveness or sustaining employment. That is, many questioned the logic of cutting wages to improve national competitiveness. Furthermore, the same authors in a separate ESRI publication (2008) found that centralised wage bargaining in Ireland generated wage restraint and that many sectors in the private sector used the national wage agreements as a floor not a ceiling in their company wage negotiations (McGuiness, Kelly and O'Connell, 2010) . Social partnership improved the economy wide cost competitiveness when measured in unit labour costs. The report concluded that export firms can increase their competitiveness by locating in countries with centralised wage agreements. This conclusion seems to be supported by data that analyses trends in sectoral labour costs as indicated in Figure 10a . This shows unit labour costs in the traded 'competitive oriented' manufacturing sectors of Ireland decreasing relative to the OECD average from 2000-2007. Figure 10b and 10c, however, indicates that overall unit labour costs in the economy (labour costs divided by entire working population) have increased beyond the eurozone average. This is particularly the case when the public and semi-state sectors are included in the analysis. This, in turn, would support the thesis by Traxler et al (2010) that the type of social partnership arrangements that emerged in Ireland, are associated with sheltered pay bargains that do not internalise non-inflationary wage growth. The collective increase in unit labour costs supports the argument that public sector wage costs have driven up overall unit labour costs in the economy. But saving costs in the government sector is not the same as improving competitiveness across the economy. And it was the latter argument that was used in the Irish case for a collective devaluation of wages. Labour costs chased monetary induced inflation in the Irish economy post-EMU. The causal factor behind this was a house-price boom associated with an oversupply of cheap credit and facilitated by pro-cyclical fiscal policies, not social partnership.
Hence, the absence of a shared analysis on the competitiveness problem and a unilateral pay cut by government, altered the political context within which a negotiated solution could be reached. This is categorically different from the public finance crisis that gave birth to the coordinating role of the Prime Ministers Department in the social partnership process, in 1987. In this agreement trade unions were granted income tax reductions, a 2 percent nominal increase in pay, and active participation in a national development programme aimed at employment growth. From this period on, centralised wage agreements and social partnership became directly associated with the politics of Fianna Fáil. Whether this could have been avoided via a centralised social partnership agreement is a moot point. But it does suggest that institutional coordination by the social partners, rather than market forces, is a better mechanism to negotiate a series of trade-offs in favour of job protection and flexibility. In Ireland, the preference has been for market-clearing.
The Impact of Fiscal
The EU/IMF Support Programme in 2010 required the government to establish an independent review of two distinct wage-setting mechanisms for the low paid in the Irish economy: Employment Regulation Orders (EROs) and Registered Employment Agreements (REAs). ERO's primarily cover the pay of employees in hotels, restaurants and retail outlets. These are negotiated by joint labour committees (JLC's), composed of employer and trade union representatives and generally set wage floors that are 8 percent above the national minimum wage (€8.65). The 'Registered Employment Agreements' (REA's) legally extend collective agreements across particular sectors. These are primarily used in the construction and electrical contracting sectors. An independent review recommended that these wage-setting mechanisms be retained but reformed 6 , arguing that there was little competitiveness gains to be achieved through de-regulating collective bargaining This recommendation did not fit the preference of the Irish Business and Economic Confederation (IBEC), and the main voice calling for flexibilisation of these institutions, the Small Firms Association (SFA). But in July 2011 the High Court declared sections of the legislation governing the ERO system unconstitutional. Subsequent to this, the pay and conditions of 200,000 workers remained in a precarious position, with some employers seeking unilateral pay cuts (contravening the 1991 Non-Payment of Wages Act). Importantly, one of the main defenders of the wage setting system after the High Court judgement were employers in the contract cleaning and security sectors. This exposed sectoral divisions and a lack of coordination among employer associations, calling into the question the representativeness of important business lobby groups such as the SFA 7 . The government coalition, under pressure from the Labour party, has re-instituted the system, albeit with significant reform (i.e. increased flexibility and inability to pay clauses). It is reform of this labour market institution that has caused most political turbulence among the social partners, as its re-establishment is generally considered a victory for trade unions.
5 A separate survey, published on the 24 th May 2012, by the retail based MANDATE Union, has shown that their members, on average, have suffered income cuts of €107 per week, primarily because of working hour reductions. 6 Similar to an ESRI (2012) study, this report found that there were little competitiveness or employment gains to be achieved through deregulating labour markets, collective bargaining and wage setting institutions. 7 There is minimal data available by employer associations in Ireland on who they actually represent, and how decisions are actually taken. This makes them more like 'lobby groups', quite unlike European employer associations.
Labour market and Labour relations
Using the OECD index of 'strictness of employment protection', only one country (UK) in the EU has a more flexible labour market than Ireland. This flexibility has made it is easier for employers to let staff go during the crisis. Minimal support has been provided by the state for policies aimed at short term working or alternative labour market policies to minimize employment losses through additional income supports, reflecting the liberal nature of the Irish labour market. The focus is on supply side reforms which includes the restructuring of the main training agency (FÁS). Whilst the public finance crisis has removed the resources required for a job stimulus, an ambitious 'action plan for jobs', to be achieved over four years, has been adopted, with a lot of input from employer associations. In addition to this, the government have prioritised tax breaks for the financial sector, introduced a flat rate of tax for all households/employees, developed a national internship scheme, reduced payments of statutory redundancy to employers and developed comprehensive sectoral based employment plan for the export sectors of the economy. None of this is done in conjunction with the social partners.
The social partners have observed an absence of policy coherence by the newly elected government on labour market issues, including the pathways to work scheme, job-bridge and springboard programmes, all of which are spread out over three administrative departments. The labour market policy unit, previously based in the Department of Enterprise and Jobs (where FÁS used to be located), has been transferred between the Department of Education and Social Protection. This reflects a long standing shift in the Department of Enterprise away from industrial relations and labour market issues toward competition, supply-side reforms in training & skills, trade and innovation. The structure is quite unlike most European countries whereby a dedicated department to labour market and social policy supports the administrative management of Bismarckian type social security regimes. Ireland has the second highest job vacancy to unemployment ratio in the OECD. There are 56 unemployed for every job vacancy. Given the skillset of unemployed construction workers, and those in the retail sector, these are faced with the prospect of long term unemployment, re-skilling for future jobs or emigration. The employment crisis is one of demand not supply. 
Social Security and Employment Protection
Headline social welfare payments rates have not been cut in Ireland, despite an austerity package that after six years will amount to more than 16 percent of GDP. However, this masks significant reductions in the payment of child and single parent support supplements (amounting to €475 million or 2 percent of total departmental spend). In other government departments, the burden of adjustment has primarily occurred in education, community welfare schemes and healthcare. New active labour market policies are being developed aimed at ensuring a requirement by the unemployed to take up all offers of employment. A pathway to work scheme has been introduced aimed at retraining and up-skilling. But none of this is done in conjunction with the social partners.
The overall objective is increasing flexibility and ensuring a business friendly regime. The most important and high profile collective bargaining response to the crisis is in the public sector: the 'Croke Park' agreement. It was negotiated through the chief executive of the LRC in 2010, after the failed social partnership negotiations in 2009. Through this agreement, public sector unions, rather than ICTU, are heavily involved in the management of the public finance crisis. For the government it provides political cover and a framework to deliver the necessary industrial stability to implement cost saving measures. The core features of the agreement include: no more pay cuts for public servants in return for industrial peace, reform of bonus payments, a recruitment freeze in health and education, and new pay and conditions for new entrants to the public service. Importantly, the majority of cost reductions in the public sector, to reduce the pay bill by an additional €3bn by 2014, are occurring via voluntary redundancies. Where these will be implemented is not part of the Croke Park agreement. Hence, for the government, the agreement is a strategy to guarantee industrial peace in pursuit of its public sector reform agenda. Central to this is a lean policy focused public service, the sale of semi-state assets and greater use of external service providers.
In 2013, the present government will have a choice whether to renew the Croke Park Agreement with public sector unions, or proceed with further pay cuts. Given the extent of the debt crisis facing the Irish state, and the percentage of expenditure on public sector salaries, it is highly uncertain what strategy the government will pursue. Presently the health and education sectors are doing most of the cost savings through a radical reduction in staff numbers. This will put unforeseen pressure on a public sector which according to the OECD (2009) is already small by international standards. But efficiency savings in the public sector, as a mechanism to reduce the budget deficit, will not solve Ireland's public debt or fiscal crisis. The impact of the austerity driven reforms will open up new cleavages among public sector employees as new entrants will be entering on significantly reduced pay and conditions to their unionised colleagues. This dualisation is a serious problem that needs to be confronted by public sector unions.
ICTU-IBEC Protocol in the Private Sector
The Croke park agreement illustrates that collective bargaining is most influential in the most unionised sectors of the economy: semi-state and public services. Outside the public sector there has been a decentralization of wage bargaining to company level, and managed by the IBEC-ICTU protocol. This agreement is premised on a strategy to sustain employment, when companies face economic difficulty. In practice, it is symbolic, and serves as a mechanism to show the dispute resolution agencies of the state, that ICTU and IBEC still recognise one another. Outside this protocol there are examples of innovative approaches to company level partnership in the unionised private sector. Kirchhoff, Leo, Kerry Foods, Becton Dickenson, Saica and Theo Benning have all engaged with the SIPTUs (Service, Industrial and Professional Trade Union) ideas institute which is aimed at developing a bi-partite approach to change.
But in the non-unionised sectors of the economy reforms are being driven by employers not coordinated collective bargaining. This has led to increased fragmentation and dualisation in the Irish labour market.
Collective bargaining only exists in the declining unionised sectors of the economy, and the public sector.
In recognition of this trade unions have made a legal right to collective bargaining a core part of their strategy for 2012-2013.
Despite fifty five affiliates to ICTU, most are staff or professional associations. SIPTU and UNITE are the only large scale industry based unions with cross-sectoral representation, and these, in addition to MANDATE, are driving the core strategy of ICTU's public investment proposal.
Simultaneously SIPTU, MANDATE and UNITE have developed an 'organising agenda', in response to a rapid decline in trade union density and the 'casualisation' of the workforce in the private sector, but this is proving difficult. SIPTU, in particular, has been equipped to service its members via government sponsored social partnership. Large private sector unions are struggling, more than their public sector associations, to find an identity in the absence of direct access to government. SIPTU have, however, developed a variety of sectoral based responses in the chemical, pharma and electronics sectors. Presently, few of the large unions would support a partnership deal that would link them with responsibility for the managing the public finance crisis.
In the absence of a social partnership agreement and a new role of Labour in government, ICTU have yet to develop an encompassing strategy, beyond strong advocacy for an investment stimulus aimed at employment growth. They have prioritised resources to fund a new economic think tank, the 'Nevin Institute', aimed at providing an alternative economic analysis to the Department of Finance and the ESRI. But there is no underlying shared technical analysis on how to generate economic and employment growth by ICTU, IBEC and government, even though they all agree that 'growth' is the only way to resolve the debt crisis. ICTU want the government to pursue a public investment strategy, using nationalpension and European strategic investment funds, in addition to off-balance stimulus. IBEC share this growth agenda but not public investment, whilst the government are firmly committed to its fiscal adjustment targets. They have introduced a fiscal advisory council, medium term spending ceilings on all government departments and currently in the process of legislating for a 'fiscal responsibility bill'.
Economic growth is to be achieved through labour market and product reforms.
Withdrawal of the state from social partnership has exposed an underlying weakness of trade union and employer associations in coordinating their interest's autonomously. There has not been an organised decentralisation of wage coordination, limited support has been provided to collective bargaining, and there is no state support for statutory short-term working schemes or the flexible reduction of working time with partial compensation for income losses 9 . This narrow focus on labour costs and fiscal consolidation has led some to conclude that twenty two years of social partnership is a case of 'Thatcherism Delayed'. But given the monetary constraints of the EMU member-states must pursue an internal devaluation (Baccaro & Armingeon, 2012) . The implication is that the entire distributional burden of adjustment is shifted on to fiscal and labour market policy 10 . To move beyond this requires a transnational European response. This is a challenge for all the actors in Ireland.
Assessing the Impact of the Crisis on Social Partnership
In the majority non-unionised and precarious sectors of the labour market there is little or no interaction with the industrial relations institutions of the state. This has exposed a representational crisis for ICTU, whose affiliates have experienced a gradual decline in trade union density and bargaining coverage 11 (EU Commission, the ECB and IMF) adjustment program. The focus is firmly fixed on fiscal consolidation (to generate a Ricardian equivalence in the macro-economy, and achieve a budget deficit below 3% of GDP by 2015) not economic growth or investment 13 . In this context, a renewal of labour inclusive social partnership, under the constraints of the Troika adjustment program, is highly unlikely.
The Future of Social Partnership in the EMU
The economic crisis has not resulted in a breakdown in industrial relations because of a pragmatic preference by the social partners for stability. Whilst there is no formal social partnership agreement, the relationships built up over twenty two years has led to important sectoral based agreements such as Croke Park. In the private sector there is no incentive for Irish employers to engage in a coordinated labour market response to the crisis. The strategy has been to cut jobs rather than wages as a strategy of adjustment. In the absence of beneficial constraints on employers, to improve labour market coordination, social partnership will remain a centralised process dependent on the political preference of government.
This illustrates the limits of voluntarism in a context of weakened private sector unions and nonencompassing employer associations. To improve economic growth, production strategies, employment performance and social dialogue requires an institutional reconfiguration aimed at embedding social partnership, and equalizing power relations, in the labour market. The role of the state in facilitating this process is central, but it remains unlikely that government will legislate for a right to collective bargaining. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Source: Irish Central Bank 
